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Chapais nominated seven biologically grounded compo-
nents, such as pair bonding, from which, he argues, parental
control over mating naturally flows. Yet, an important com-
ponent appears to be lacking from this list, namely parental
motivation to control mating. More specifically, even if par-
ents have a capacity to control mate choice, it does not follow
that they will actually do so, as motivation is also required.
I have argued that the primary motivation of parents comes
from having evolved a predisposition to control their chil-
dren’s mating decisions, which in turn has been the outcome
of conflicting interests over mating (Apostolou 2010).
In particular, parents and children are genetically related
but not genetically identical, which means that their interests
in mate choice, to a certain degree, diverge (Trivers 1974).
Accordingly, a fitness-maximizing spouse for children is not
always a fitness-maximizing in-law for parents, as some traits
in a prospective mate give different benefits to the former
than to the latter (Apostolou 2007b; Perilloux, Fleischman,
and Buss 2011). In consequence, when children exercise mate
choice, they make compromises which are not optimal for
their parents (Apostolou 2011). This is costly for the latter,
and this cost translates into evolutionary pressure exercised
on them to place their children’s behavior under their control
(Apostolou 2014). Parents with this predisposition would be
better off than parents without it, because the former would
have in-laws who maximize their fitness, while the latter
would have in-laws who maximize their children’s fitness.
For this predisposition to spread in the population, parents
need to be able to control their children’s mating behavior,
or else those parents with the predisposition would be worse
off than those without it, as they would sacrifice resources in
attempting to control mate choice without any results. Chap-
ais recognizes that parents have the capacity to influence their
children’s mating behavior which turns this predisposition
beneficial, resulting in a universal parental willingness to con-
trol mating. Still, if parents and children had identical interests
over mating, children exercising mate choice on their own
would choose spouses who would maximize their own, as
well as their parents’ fitness; thus, there would be no reason
for the latter to control mating even if they have the capacity
to do so.
The capacity to control mate choice is contingent on the
specific cultural context. For instance, in preindustrial soci-
eties where individuals of marital age are more dependent on
their family for survival and protection, parents have a higher
capacity to control mate choice than in postindustrial soci-
eties, where children are getting married when they are fi-
nancially independent from their parents (Apostolou 2010).
Accordingly, direct control over mate choice in the form of
arranged marriage is found in preindustrial societies and not
in postindustrial ones. Yet, in the latter context, the evolved
predisposition to control mate choice does not remain silent,
but it is expressed differently through manipulation. In par-
ticular, in postindustrial societies, parents employ a wide range
of manipulation tactics, which include acts such as crying,
giving advice, and lying, in order to influence indirectly their
daughters’ and sons’ mating decisions (Apostolou 2013).
One insight that Chapais offers in his paper is that although
certain social patterns, such as arranged marriages, are not
found in all human cultures, they are universal in the sense
that they are consistently present in similar sets of social cir-
cumstances—they are therefore context-dependent universals.
In the mate choice domain, the parental disposition to influ-
ence mating is not context-dependent, but the way it is man-
ifested is. Thus, in a context where parents have a capacity
to control mate choice directly, arranged marriage will emerge,
and in contexts where their capacity is limited, manipulation
over mating behavior will emerge.
Overall, the notion that many traits constitute biological
grounded categories operating as templates for the creation
of cultural variants in form and meaning constitutes a fruitful
way for studying the interactions between evolved predis-
positions and environmental contexts in giving rise to ob-
served cultural and behavioral patterns.
Alan Barnard
School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh,
Chrystal Macmillan Building, 15a George Square, Edinburgh EH8
9LD, United Kingdom (a.barnard@ed.ac.uk). 11 VI 14
I congratulate Bernard Chapais on his attempt to explain
kinship in terms of sociocultural universals, although I have
some slight misgivings about what is missing from his analysis,
namely a consideration of language. For many years as a
kinship specialist I have long been intrigued by the degree of
similarity, as well as difference, in kinship structures. As a
recent convert to the interplay between social and biological
aspects of a larger anthropology (to which Chapais has greatly
contributed), I think he is definitely on the right track.
Within social or cultural anthropology, there have been few
attempts to raise such questions. Malinowski (1944:75–84)
was one exception, although his attempt was weak and sim-
plistic. Starting from a foundation in primate studies or bi-
ological anthropology more generally does offer more hope,
as indeed Piddington (1957:48–51) suggested. In a way, I see
Chapais’s notion of building cultural diversity on a biological
foundation in this vein. However, the fundamental difference
between humans and Pan is that the former categorize and
the latter do not. Therefore, there cannot be an evolution
from chimpanzee tendencies toward incest avoidance (see also
Fox 1975) to human categories of avoidance. The two are in
fact quite different. In human kinship the categorization is
absolute, which is, after all, how incest is defined. That is also
how the incest can be both “natural” (in existence in all
human societies) and “cultural” (defined differently in each
human society), as Le´vi-Strauss (1969:12–25) noted. In this
article, Chapais pays only minimal attention to language,
which for me has to be the main defining difference between
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human and chimpanzee cultures. Among humans language
is universal; among chimpanzees it is nonexistent. Primate
communication is something very different.
The long-term evolution of kinship (at least since Homo
ergaster) should take account of the emergence of language,
or at least the interplay between the development of linguistic
categories and the classification of relatives (Barnard 2008).
In the shorter term (since the beginnings of language proper),
the use of kinship relations and the categories that represent
them is much more nuanced (see Barnard 2013). Parts of
what Chapais argues imply this, but he does not directly con-
front the problem. For example, class 6 (composite-exclusive)
traits include recognition of patrilineal relatedness and affinal
ties, and class 7 (cognitively-generated) traits include traits
that require group recognition and language. Fortes (1983)
wrote definitively on the importance of jural rules (which
require articulation through language) and the fact that these
are what differentiates humans from other primates. Chapais
(2008:74–76) indeed cites and quotes from Fortes’s work on
this in Primeval Kinship, though he touches on it only pe-
ripherally in the present article. It is a great pity that Chapais
does not pay more attention to the importance of language
in kinship (e.g., in the evolution of kin classification), for
therein seems to lie a level beyond composite traits that has
yet to be explained.
R. I. M. Dunbar
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford,
Oxford OX1 3UD, United Kingdom (robin.dunbar@psy.ox.ac.uk).
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Bernard Chapais’s attempt to create a proper synthesis of
biological and cultural approaches to human marriage, social
systems, and kinship is both much to be welcomed and long
overdue. I approve thoroughly and agree with most of what
he says. I will raise only two issues, neither of which should
be considered fatal flaws in his argument, but which are, I
think, an important part of the story nonetheless and we
should have them correct.
The first revolves around the human mating system. Chap-
ais seems to take it for granted that humans are monogamous,
and that pair-bonds exist to enable biparental care. This is
odd for two reasons. One is that it would seem to confuse
monogamy (as a marriage system) with pair-bonding (a so-
cial, often temporary, arrangement between couples). Hu-
mans undoubtedly pair-bond; they are much less often mo-
nogamous in the sense that we can use this term of primates.
The other point is that it may well be true that human males
(occasionally) engage in parental care—though their efforts
can hardly be said to be impressive—but this does not mean
to say that biparental care is the primary function of pair-
bonding in humans.
There have been just three plausible hypotheses offered for
the evolution of monogamy in primates (biparental care, dis-
persed females, and infanticide). A proper analysis of the
comparative data demonstrates—rather uncompromisingly—
that the first two only appear after the adoption of monogamy
as a mating system; high infanticide risk, on the other hand,
always precedes the adoption of monogamy (Dunbar 1995;
Opie et al. 2013). Convention in science, as in everyday life,
holds that causes precede their consequences, not follow
them. (It would not be sensible to suggest, for example, that
species adopt monogamy in order later to permit paternal
care: that would require a species to evolve an adaptation
before it has any benefit from it.) Sadly, recent attempts to
examine this question (notably those cited by Chapais, such
as Gavrilets 2012 and Lukas and Clutton-Brock 2013) have
not always been as clear-thinking in their analyses. This is
particularly obvious in respect of the claim that monogamy
in primates evolved because females started to live in dispersed
ranges that were too big for males to defend. In fact, not only
do monogamous females not have per capita ranges that are
larger (or smaller) than those of polygamous territorial spe-
cies, but almost all males from monogamous species have the
capacity to defend territories large enough to include the
ranges of five or more females: this was shown 30 years ago
(Dunbar 1988), and new analyses confirm and extend these
findings. In short, the core assumption of the Lukas/Clutton-
Brock claim does not hold. Female dispersion certainly ex-
plains monogamy in many mammals, but it does not do so
in primates. Nor does biparental care. I am impressed by the
fact that Chapais does not even mention infanticide as a pos-
sibility. The idea of infanticide clearly causes so much angst
that, evidence and logic notwithstanding, its history has been
dogged by desperate and largely specious attempts to duck it
(or claim it doesn’t exist) ever since it was first proposed by
Sarah Hrdy 40 years ago. That’s a pity: it might make sense
of a lot of things both primates and humans do, one of which
is the fact that both mate-choice processes and pair-bond
intensity tend to be female biased (see, e.g., Palchykov et al.
2012).
The second issue I want to raise concerns multilevel social
systems. Chapais argues that in primates, “the social group
is the highest level of social organization: groups do not com-
bine to form higher level social entities.” This isn’t strictly
true. With the possible exception of the monogamous species,
all primates live in multilevel social systems that are highly
substructured (Hill et al. 2008; Kudo and Dunbar 2001). In
some cases, these grouping levels may be quite dispersed; in
other cases, they may even involve polyspecific associations
with allied species (e.g., African forest guenons; Korstjens,
Lehmann, and Dunbar 2014, in preparation). The capacity
to manage multilevel sociality is one of the hallmarks of being
a primate (or, at least, a certain kind of cognitively advanced
primate); what is true is that humans have been able to use
this capacity to create additional levels of grouping above the
more conventional ones. What is, perhaps, interesting is that
in no culture does human kinship terminology extend out
